The joke-secret and an ethics of modern individuality: From Freud to Simmel by Smith, Daniel
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/138543/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Smith, Daniel 2021. The joke-secret and an ethics of modern individuality: From Freud to Simmel.
Theory, Culture and Society file 
Publishers page: 
Please note: 
Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
1 
 
The joke-secret and an ethics of modern individuality: From Freud to Simmel  
 
Abstract: Why has comedy become one of our most abiding ethical preoccupations as well 
as a dominant mode of political critique? It is suggested that comedy appeals to 
contemporary persons because it provides an apt social-aesthetic form through which to 
face up to living with others at a time when it is hard to bear others or otherness. The article 
outlines an ethics of modern individuality by developing a theory of comedy as more about 
building social bonds and finding out what could be shared knowledge and experience, than 
the toppling of dominant modes of thought or repudiating our mutuality with others. 
D a i g o  Geo g “i el s The La  of the I di idual  the a ti le de elops a Simmelian 
eadi g of F eud s Jokes to argue that comedy is one solution to resolving our mutual un-
alikeness by way of forging knotted paths toward recognising how we could be alike. 
 
Introduction 
 The ethical permissibility of our laughter has become one of our most abiding 
preoccupations. From past sit-coms, present-day stand-up routines, and presidential tweets, 
the uestio  Do you find that funny?  i pli itl  asks, Should you find that funny?  
Comedy has come under considerable ethical scrutiny because it is also one of our primary 
odes of politi al iti ue: i  ou  ultu e a  uestio s a ou d ide tit  diffe e e a d 
parities of recognition, the validity of individual testimonies and lived experiences are being 
situated in comic routines or contexts (see Webber, 2018; Rehak & Trnka, 2018; Krefting, 
2014). As much as we debate the permissibility of laughter in political and cultural realities, 
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we are invited to question the permissibility of these realities through the medium of 
comedy. 
 But my purpose in this article is not to adjudicate upon the merits of using comedy 
when addressing the political present (for this see Giamario, 2020). Instead, the aim is to 
step in-between these divisions and ask why the desire to use comedy to address these 
problems arises, and what the ethics underlying these investments consist of. In comedy 
scholarship, whether humour is an effective political strategy to effect changes in points of 
view remains at an impasse. For Krefting (2014) and Quirk (2018), the rebellious ontology of 
humour is apposite to effect political resistances, while for others humour remains 
ambiguously placed to shift from oppositional aesthetics to effective political resistance 
(Nielsen, 2018; Smith, 2018; Limon, 2009). With this impasse in mind, I re-describe the 
problem: maybe comedy appeals to contemporary persons because it provides an 
appropriate social and aesthetic form through which to face up to living with others at a 
time when it is harder a d ha de  to ea  othe s o  othe ess. If humor arises at a moment 
of i te se politi al i al  ites Li o  : , it a ises a o g pa ties that ha e the 
sha ed ight to o side  the sel es i ti s.  “o, i  this state, e i est i  a  aestheti  
object (laughter) which is ethically mercurial precisely because we feel ourselves to be 
unable to offer solutions to present realities. One of the problems contemporary people 
encounter is the question: Am I being laughed at or laughed with, and how do I know the 
difference? 
While the political context of contemporary humour is that of a divided society, the 
theory this article outlines suggests that the problems run much deeper than our present 
moment. The moral ambiguity of comedy - Are we laughing at or with each other? – 
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concerns the graver social a d og iti e p o le s that i di idual s fa e i  ode it : Ho  
far are we or can we be mutually understood? What form could our alikeness take under 
social conditions of plurality? Humour becomes one social form wherein acknowledgement 
of our possible mutuality of being and knowing each other is being staged and posed, 
(rather than resolved or answered). And crucially the ethical form humour takes reflects 
these tensions. If humour appeals to us as its stages our equivocations, the ethical form it 
puts i  pla e is o e he e ou a d I  e ai  u e tai  of ho  to p o eed as ou a d I , so 
we turn to mutual idiocy to do so. 
I lo ate the egi i gs of this theo  i  a e eadi g of F eud s The Joke as a “o ial 
Process   th ough “i el s la  of the indi idual  . F eud asks: … h  do I ot 
laugh at  o  joke? A d hat is the pa t pla ed i  the p o ess  the othe  pe so ?  
(Freud, 2002:141) The relationality of the joke-work is an auspicious point of entry for 
e eadi g F eud th ough “i el s philosophy of society and ethics. For Simmel (2010), too, 
sees ode  ethi s guided  the dail  de a d to e ou sel es  u de  o ditio s he e 
the others we are around are indeterminate. While I feel there is much similarity between 
Freud and Simmel, Simmel is an unusual theorist for an article on comedy. Simmel (1997) is 
a philosopher of the tragic nature of modern existence, and while he was influenced by and 
influenced philosophers with a humour theory (Kant, Bergson, Bakhtin), his writing has no 
sustained theory of comedy (and the exceptions use comedy as a negative referent for 
tragic experience (Simmel, 2020a/b; Simmel, 2010:183-185)). This notwithstanding, I offer 
my Simmelian Freud as a counterpoint to prevailing humour theories. For humour theories 
typically involve the denial of mutuality with others: laughter is sublimated aggression (e.g. 
Hobbes, 1981), repressed ill-thought F eud, , laughi g at the othe s li d-spots in 
self-perception (Plato, 1981), reminding them of their true humanity (Bergson, 1981), or the 
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overturning of prevailing modes of thought (Bakhtin, 1984). By contrast, I ask what specific 
form of self-other relationality arises by way of jokes and laughter, and how they recall the 
conditions of modern existence? 
To do this first I outli e “i el s  ethi s i  his La  of the i di idual  a d 
suggest that a comic alternative is possible to his tragic original. Second, I situate the comic 
alternative in the relationship between humour and modernity: for me contemporary 
humour localises the tensions of fractured experience and social difference modernity 
establishes, epitomised by the stand-up comedian as a dramatic figure. Through the 
performances of stand-up comedians, humour becomes a a  to a igate ode it s 
tensions. I g ou d this i  a  a ou t  the o edia  Joh  Go dillo ho see s o te po a  
humour underlined by a desire for a mutuality of being together and knowing one another 
in circumstances unfavourable to it. Third I appl  Go dillo s a ou t to two features of 
“i el s ide  so iolog , the p o le  of k o ledge of self a d othe  “i el,  a d 
the lengthening and shortening of the teleological series of purposes (Simmel, 2011). 
Fourth, I develop what I am calling the ethi s of the joke-se et  th ough a e eading of 
F eud s The Joke as “o ial P o ess   alo gside “i el s so iolog  of the se et . 
While I concede comedy has long been perceived to be beyond ethics and politics, the 
article concludes that the joke-se et  a  e ie ed as a o tribution to a vision of 
cosmopolitanism found in Said (2003) and Kristeva (1991). 
 Si el’s The La  of the I di idual: a co ic alter ati e 
“i el s ethi s asks Ca  this a t defi e  e ti e life?  Simmel places moral 
o ligatio  i  the a tualit  of the individual. It is not that my life is subject to only my own 
vision of what is considered good, but rather my ethical obligation (ought) to be good arises 
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from my actuality as a unique person whose life is singular and finite. My life is objective in 
the sense that no one else is me (i.e. objectivity does not imply supra-individuality) and my 
ethical goods are duties comprehended in line with a view from my entire life (i.e. 
subjectivity does not lead to solipsism or nihilism). As Nielsen (2002:98) states: the act 
defi es o e s e ti e life histo  if o e a epts that life is ot the su  of se e al a tio s ut 
o e o ti uous a t.  We eet i  this ethi al elatio  th ough utuall  o stituted 
difference: we are o ple e ta  ith espe t to the u i ue ess of each.  Nielse , 
2002:98) 
In this way Simmel envisages our social relations as orientating actuality (the life I 
am leading) and ought (the life I want to lead) i  ea h i sta e. Ea h i te a tio  p esu es 
that each participant manifests some ideal potential of what she could be, her unique and 
total pote tial as that i di idual pe so .  Lee & “il e , :  The i pli atio  of this is 
that if my individuality is not exhausted in such encounters (actuality), and such interactions 
are instances of a whole which is never experienced as a whole by me (my unique 
individuality in view of my entire life) nor other persons (as no-one else is able to 
comprehend my objective uniqueness): neither self and other are fully present in their 
relations. We are both mutuall  a se e i  ea h othe s p ese e. You a  e e  p ope l  
know other people or yourself (Kemple, 2018; Fritzi, 2018; Barbour, 2017; Goodstein, 2016; 
Cánto-Milá, 2016; Pyyhtinen, 2009; Lee & Silver, 2012; Morris-Reich, 2003; Nielsen, 2002). 
The ethical implications of this vision of sociability is to appreciate that no-one has a 
monopoly of knowledge upon who self and other think they are. Consequently, we seek out 
social forms where approximation of self-knowledge and knowledge of others seemingly 
fuses. It is th ough the fo s of so ia ilit  the sel es that the Ought  of the i di idual la  
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gets its logical coherence: not only have these forms given shape to a form of devotion of an 
I to you, they also shape the obligation, the person you strive to be. Bet ee  life s so ial 
forms and their accompanying Ought, Simmel locates the biggest stumbling block to his 
ethics. What he calls the tragedy of culture (Simmel, 1997) inheres in our social-ethical 
forms: the social forms we produce to express and shape our shared life, once created, 
become external to life and perceived as obstacles (Simmel, 2010:104f). The tragedy being 
for Simmel not that the forms, in and of themselves, are inadequate. The forms themselves 
are all we have got to gain a semblance of knowing ourselves and others in our mutual 
absences. Instead the tragedy stems from the fact that the form is incapable of sustaining 
the Ought, that is, realising the unique life of the individual. The Ought a d the I  do ot 
coincide: once life has taken the shape of the Ought, it is no longer self-identical with life.  
Simmel was not forthcoming with illustrations of social forms capable of capturing 
the individual law, but Kemple (2018) has offe ed his Theat e a d the D a ati  A to  
(Simmel, 2020a). The i e  o t adi tio  “i el, :  of theat e is ho  a  
individual can give form and inner direction to a life through content which is shaped and 
ordered from beyond them. The acto s ge ius is ot to ake the s ipt o e to life  ut to 
e oke a third ele e t  et ee  s ipt a d a to : a eed fo  this a to  …to espo d to a 
ole as the la  that a ues to this pa ti ula  pe so alit  f o  the ole.  “i el, 
2020a:262, original emphasis) The point being that words and deeds which are external to 
the subject become not merely alive but perceived as only this a to s u i ue fate a d 
desti . This is o e i ge ious solutio  ut, as Ke ple :  a k o ledges, su h a 
realisation is ot possi le fo  e e o e a d a  o l  e ithi  ea h fo  a fe .  But I think 
we can overcome the tragedy of individuality if we look for a comic alternative in this vein. 
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Instead of the dramatic actor, the figure offered here is the stand-up comedian. The 
comedian shares with the dramatic actor the essential criteria for realising the individual 
law: the feeling that only this comedian can tell this joke in that way to evoke laughter (see 
Smith, 2018 for empirical cases). But what distinguishes the theatrical actor and the stand-
up o edia  is that the o edia s a t is not external text turned into inner-life, but their 
unique inner-life tu ed i to e te al te t i.e. o i  outi es . The i e  o t adi tio  is 
reversed and with it the fate of the ethical conduct dramatized. When Simmel contends that 
o l  this a to  can realise, say, Hamlet, through the uniqueness of their personality, he has 
in mind the form and fate of the tragic. Simmel (2010:184, ¶ 147) treats tragedy as enacting 
universal moral problems, while the fate of the tragic figure is solely individual. It is because 
the tragic figure individualises universal moral problems that Simmel will raise them to the 
epitome of the individual law: tragedy is where external forces coincide with the inner 
meaning of a singular life. The form and fate of the comedian is the opposite: I  o ed  a 
tho oughl  i di idual fate is e a ted  t pe ha a te s  : , ¶ 147) Turning their 
inner-life into comic routines, the comedian becomes cartoon-like. For Simmel this means 
that a comedian fails to reach the epitome of individuality achieved by the tragic figure: the 
o edia s fate is ot ou d up ith the ulti ate g ou d of life a d its e essa  desti  
(Simmel, 2010:183, ¶ 147). 
Simmel formalises this as follows: I  t aged , out a d ha e is i a d e essit  – 
in comed , out a d e essit  is i a d ha e.  “i el, : , ¶ 147) But while 
Simmel does not value the comic figure, I contend that their sociological fate is more 
germane to the nature of modernity and its vision of ethical freedom. Crucial to Simmel s 
(1971) account of modernity is that it is epitomised by type characters (e.g. the stranger) 
who, while not positively identified with, nevertheless resist exclusion: what or who is 
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strange is not something we can ignore because acknowledgement of them as odd requires 
ep ese tatio  a d i teg atio  i to hat e take to e o al a d o thodo . “i el s 
philosophical point with such sociological type characters was that what is normal is, as 
“ o s sa s : , al a s tou hed  a o ti ge  that ill not e esol ed.  Fo  
our purposes, comedy gains its ethical value from this fact: that there is something about 
ourselves which is always outward necessity means that we are never as inner-orientated as 
we appear to be. Acting out inner-life as if it were external text, the comic alternative 
suggests this: the outward necessity to realise individuality in social forms inadequate to our 
individuality makes that unresolvable inward chance, or contingency, the precondition for 
individuality as such. I could be me, and you be you, in such a way that this is not the only 
a  fo  ou to e ou  a d e to e e . 
Comedy in modernity 
 I see this ambition at work in contemporary humour, epitomised by the stand-up 
comedian. For what accounts of humour in modern societies pivot around is a dialectic of 
repulsion and assimilation: on the one hand modernity involves a pluralisation of life-worlds 
hi h akes e e o e …a he eti  to so eo e else  Co a k et. al., : ; see Be ge , 
2014; Feltmate, 2013; Billig, 2005; Wi k e g, . The pe so alit  t ait e all ou  se se 
of hu ou , u de li ed  a  o ligatio  to ot take ou sel es so se iousl  Wi k e g, 
1998), reflects a cultu al se si ilit  de eloped to ha dle ode it s i o siste es a d 
incongruities of competing life-worlds. A sense of humour is the instrumental ability to 
compensate for the fault of the social at the level of the individual psyche (Billig, 2005). 
While, o  the othe , the o se ue e of a plu alit  of life o ld s gi es ise to the eed for 
an economising of experience under conditions of social differentiation. In this state, a 
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shared sense of humour gives rise to densely nuanced and insular series of in-group 
sentiments. Knowing what is funny evidences both a high degree of social differentiation 
but also an inter-personal intelligence of how to be with those like you (Kuipers, 2015; 
Weaver, 2011; Fine & Soucey, 2005). What we take to be our ability to make ourselves and 
others laugh, as well as our obligation to laugh at ourselves is a co se ue e of ode it s 
fragmentary character of life.  
 Elsewhere I have offered the stand-up o edia s comic persona as the cultural 
epito e of ode it s f ag e tary character of life. A comic persona recalls the divisions 
between a plurality of life worlds and the obligation to live within collective labels in a 
society premised upon individual uniqueness (Smith, 2019). As humour scholars have 
demonstrated, a comic persona is understood to exist somewhere between their lived 
identities and an abject comic exaggeration of these identities (Quirk, 2018; Nelsen, 2018; 
Smith, 2019; Krefting, 2014; Tonder, 2014; Weaver, 2011). Importantly these scholars are all 
agreed that when acting out their routines the comedian inhabits an abject stereotype: the 
abject ille ial  i  the e  ge e atio  of alte ati e o edia s Qui k, ; “ ith, 
2019); or historic forms minstrelsy that guide the racial humour of Hari Kondabolu (Krefting, 
2014), Omid Djailili (Weaver, 2011), David Chappelle (Tonder, 2014). Abject stereotypes 
stage the tension between being other to every other, a singular individual in conditions of 
plurality.  
Another term for a comic persona could be a caricatured version of their lived 
ide tities. “i el s O  Ca i atu e   defi es a a icatured self as one where what is 
exaggerated – my appearances as a stereotypical millennial, say – is juxtaposed to 
something that is not exaggerated enough. This over- and under-exaggeration gives rise to 
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a use e t, a d he ei  lies that i a d ha e  for e ui o atio  o  ho e a e : We 
k o  that the o edia s ited a e oth ot ste eot pi al e ough to e  thei  o i  
caricature, but we also know they are not given the f eedo  to e othe  to thei  
stereotyped selves as the stereotype is the source of their comic power. Their abject 
pe so a gi es the  the i a d ha e  to tu  out a d e essit  – their societal identity – 
into an aesthetic representation that can stage the frustrations of their living sense of self. 
Fo  a i atu e is o i i g to us onl  he e the state of affai s is itself al ead  a i atu e.  
(Simmel, 2020b:188) The turn to abject stereotypes – which are both done to and done by 
the o edia s – underlines a societal condition where we continuously feel abject. In 
caricature we can see so ethi g o pe sati g fo  e tai  defi ie ies of ou  k o ledge, 
ho e e  pa tisa  it a  see .  “i el, :  
What is deficient in our knowledge is an answer to ode it s p o le s that the 
o edia s o i  ate ial e alls. As Li o  : ) re a ks: at a o e t … he  
a je tio  is sta tli gl  pe asi e…sta d-up i he its its highest aspi atio .  Li o  alls this 
spread of stand-up o ed  to life s p o le s the o edifi atio  of so iet : a di e sit  of 
people now turn to comedy and find their desires and frustrations voiced in its performers 
(predominantly through the late-night comedy news show (The Mash Report; The Daily 
Show; The Colbert Report)). But I think there is also a deeper problem of the conditions of a 
mutuality of being with each othe  a d fi di g sha ed k o ledge of ho  the o ld is  at 
work in contemporary comedy. 
Given this I want to further ground this felt experience which underlines the 
prevailing forms of humour in the words of a comedian who has been able to capture its 
ethos in a very eloquent way. The words are those of comedian and comedy director John 
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Gordillo from The Co edia ’s Co edia  Pod ast (2014), (the empirical source material for 
Quirk (2018) and Smith (2019)). While Gordillo has worked with some political comedians 
(e.g. Reginald D. Hunter), here Gordillo speaks of (stand-up) comedy generally. In doing so 
he can outline the shared ethos by which comedy at present is written and performed, 
giving us a more grounded view of the caricatured sense of self I detect in contemporary 
hu ou . I ould like to use Go dillo s o ds as the asis to de i e, f o  a lose eadi g, a  
ethics of self-other relations which speaks to why comedy is desired by contemporary 
persons.  
This is Go dillo s state e t o  the ethos u de l ing contemporary comedy: 
You try and set up what the power of a thing has over you, why 
it s a p o le , a d if that o e tio  is authe ti , is spe ifi  
and is yours, then that s half of the attle o . […]  
It is about leading the audience to the specific thing 
that othe s ou. It s so ethi g …“ei feld said ea s ago, the 
ki d of o ed  that akes e laugh is… the gu  ho gets 
ou d up  the thi g he should t get ou d up about. He 
i gs ou to the poi t he  he s getti g ou d up a out the 
stitching in his wallet and how it messes with his life. And that I 
…fi d eall  fu  e ause I e e  ould ha e thought to fi d 
that a p o le .   
Of course something else happens when someone gets 
wound up about their stitching in their wallet, and how they 
get wound up. At that poi t, if ou e laughi g, at so e le el 
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ou e laughi g at them. But there is a massive identification 
goi g o , at the eta le el, e ause ou e u de sta ding the 
role those things play. You do t ha e to ha e a adl  stit hed 
wallet to laugh at it, you have to understand the nature of that 
frustration […] And how you then navigate that within your bit 
about your wallet, it becomes an essay on that: on the escape 
strategies, and the frustrations and the resentments, that we 
take out over these non-things. And at some level it is healing, 
e ause it s a lo el , a  essa  i  ou  futilit  […]  
Co ed s illia t at that, just aki g us laugh at ou  
true stupidit . […] Be ause hat sa e  thi g to do, i  the fa e 
of our futile existence, and the inevitable death, and just the 
meaninglessness of it, than laugh? That makes total sense. But 
it is the passivity involved in the laughter, there has to be a 
step after the laughter, because otherwise you would just 
laugh at stuff and not engage with it, and then horrible things 
will be done to you in the name of making you laugh (Gordillo, 
2014). 
I  Go dillo s state e t the e is a  i pli it ought fo  good o ed : You begin with self-
isolation to find togetherness; you lead an audience to how the world impinges upon you in 
the hope that the world impinges on others in the same way. Go dillo s o i  Ought 
advocates a desire for social bonds that is already obscure: to awaken collective sentiments 
you begin with idiosyncrasy. This involves a double deception: Being laughed at, Gordillo 
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suggests, is a a  to ask a assi e ide tifi atio , a  ide tifi atio  that is the  laughed 
off . This assi e ide tifi atio  e de s k o ledge of ealit  p o le ati . Life s p o le s 
appear idiosyncratic. They do so because o ed  e de s the i di idual a je t. Go dillo s 
comedian is an idiot. They appear in this way, Gordillo suggests, as comedy is a social form 
for capturing a mutuality of being between self-other when the paths to self-other 
knowledge are vague. In the wallet stitching example, a trivial and idiosyncratic foible is an 
individual problem in search of collective recognition, but the manner of this recognition is 
rendered opaque. 
Self-Other, Self-World: Jokes and the possibility of knowledge of self and world 
Unlike the ethics of humour set out by Bergson (1981), where we laugh at people to 
remind them of their organic ability to act freely and well, the ethics of humour outlined by 
Gordillo is more open to the possibility that neither party knows what acting well may 
e tail. A d u like Bakhti s  theo  of a i al, the li e atio  i  laughte  he e is ot 
the toppling of hegemonic thought, but instead trying to find out what shared knowledge of 
the o ld is o  ould o sist of. Gi e  this, Go dillo s o edian has discerned how comedy 
i gs to light hat “i el s i di idual la  i ti ated: ou  utual a se es i  fo s of 
relatedness as well as our thwarted sense of knowing what e a t a d ho  to get it  i  
our social forms. These two aspects can be furthe  ela o ated th ough “i el s Ho  is 
so iet  possi le?   a d his dis ussio  of the phe o e al o  teleologi al se ies of 
pu poses  . 
A: Jokes & Self-Other relations 
For Simmel (1910), society is made possible by our mutual recognition of our 
relationship to one another. However, while our mutual recognition is the very condition of 
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our being social, Simmel asks us to appreciate that our conceptions of this mutual 
acknowledgment must necessarily rely upon ways of conceiving of each other which violate 
our objective uniqueness. As no one else is me, and neither am I fully present with respect 
to myself, we work within limited forms of comprehension which necessarily orientate the 
knowledge of our relationship to each other. 
Simmel (1910:375-376) spells this out as follows. You exist independent of my 
existence, and thus my conception of you relies upon my building up a sensuous 
representation of you in the same manner as I do other external objects. However, unlike 
external objects, my representations of you fails to capture the independence of you from 
my representation of you. The same goes for any representation I proffer of myself; I only 
ever share part and partial versions of my entire individuality. Capturing the feeling of being 
a person cannot be gained through any adequate representation. Yet as we must forge 
ep ese tatio s of o e a othe  to elate to o e a othe , that so ethi g  ou  e  
individualit  hi h a ot e esol ed i to ou  ep ese ti g still e o es the o te t…  
(Simmel, :  As su h, the p odu t of ou  ep ese tatio  – our conceptions of each 
other – e o es the p ofou dest  o sta le to k o i g a d e o i g so ial “i el, 
1910:275-376). All social relations suffer from degrees of misrepresentation on both sides 
(see Cánto-Milá, 2016:90-92; Goodstein, 2017:317-318). 
Go dillo s o edia  has o e to a  app e iatio  of this p o le  of utual absence 
in our relatedness, and the potential for all social relations to be built around 
misrepresentation: getting their joke is also getting the measure of them as an individual. 
But our measure of them is also our measure for knowledge of the world – even if that 
knowledge may be immensely t i ial i.e. allet stit hi g . The p o le  Go dillo s o edia  
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has worked out is that acknowledgement of their distinctiveness needs to be a 
misrepresentation (caricature) of some kind – to see them as idiotic in some sense – in 
order for that idiocy to go together with an idiosyncrasy of knowledge of the world. Idiocy 
becomes the means to finding out how knowledge of the world and experience is, ironically, 
shared knowledge and experience. Bet ee  sha ed k o ledge of ho  the o ld appea s to 
us  – in quotidian experiences of, say, the frustrations of wallet stitching – and the impasses 
faced in sharing this knowledge, there appears the isolated comic individual. An individual 
rendered here idiosyncratic and idiotic, but only in so far as their idiocy is aimed at figuring 
out how or in what way shared knowledge of the world is to be attained.  
B: Jokes & Self-World intentionality 
So comic material on wallet stitching could be read – e plo i g Goodstei s 
:  eadi g of “i el s s e do he  o e e ts f o  ultu al details  to oade  
spi itual-i telle tual a d histo i al a o os s  – as atte pts i  a s e i g life s 
uestio s, all the hile k o i g that su h ig uestio s  a e e o d o ed s s ope of 
comprehension. Comedy may be understood as being the other side of the distinctive 
phenomenal experience Simmel (2011:207ff) designated for the money economy, the 
teleological series of purposes.  
The teleological series of purposes captures our inability to comprehend and 
e pe ie e life as a hole . As Goodstei  :  o e ts, it egiste s the p a ti al 
constraints on thinking e pe ie e.  Fo  i  ode it  e a e u a le to  
absolutely know the final meaning or value of the unfolding 
arrays of appearances, for we ourselves and our processes of 
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reflection belong to the very process in which our concepts are 
developing historically (Goodstein, 2017:201)  
Comedy, I suggest, is remarkably apt to capture an experience where thinking and our 
conceptualisation of thought are running up and alongside one another. 
To elaborate, the teleological sequence of purposes outlines the intellectual 
processes through which we attempt to try and connect different parts of life into a 
meaningful, singular whole. Simmel begins by observing that this desire comes, however, 
from the experience of modern life – epitomised in the money economy – where we feel 
that what is far-away can be brought within our reach, and much of what is close to us 
i ol es ou da out ea s to getti g  it “i el, : . This p olongation and 
sho te i g of the teleologi al se ies of pu poses  – what we want and how to get it – gives 
ise to a desi e to seek a si gula  isio  of life. We ish fo  a ie  of the hole  to gai  a 
sense of where our desires come from, and what they are orientated toward. Simmel 
(2011:223f) works this out as follows. With an end in mind, if I do not know how to get what 
I want my interest in getting it goes nowhere. We must know what we want to get it; and 
we must know how to get it to properly know what wanting it entails. However, under 
modern conditions, our commitments interact with an external world of inordinate 
complexity, one where the causal sequences which make up the view of our purposes 
becomes increasingly more difficult to reconstruct. Under such conditions we become more 
aware of desiring something but not knowing precisely what it is or how best to get it. 
Indeed jokes can be understood as a synecdoche for the modern worldview: with an 
end in mind - laughter - Go dillo s o edia  k o s hat they want but the psychological 
possibility of this end is one where the causal relation is made to feel inchoate or 
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mysterious. (How do you make people laugh? Is there a formula, properly speaking?) 
Simmel treated money as a psychological object where desire and our being able to 
consummate it was rendered soluble. By contrast, jokes demonstrate that you may know 
what you want (laughter as evidence of mutuality of self-other) but there is an 
indeterminacy involved. Comedy relies upon the response of others in such a way that it 
akes k o i g hat ou e getti g a d ho  ou e getti g it  opa ue (so self-other 
knowledge becomes opaque in the process). Comedy provides us with a (pleasurable, half-
known) illusion that we have overcome the pitfalls in our intellectual comprehension of our 
worlds. 
Our synecdoche is that an idiosyncratic piece of comic ate ial o  allet stit hi g  is 
also a  e pe ie e of ei g i  stit hes  i  te s of k o i g ho  to elate to self a d o ld, 
self a d othe s. Bei g i  stit hes  ith laughte  see i gl  ollapses ou  i passes ith self-
other, self-world. Jokes can be experienced as the sensuous, incongruous answer to the 
thwarted wish for a clearer view of the phenomenal series in a world unable to be grasped 
as a singular totalit . I  a “i elia  ie , F eud s :  fa ous lai  that e 
scarcely ever know what it is e a e laughi g at i  a joke  e o es less aso ial o  ep essed 
wishes, but instead our short-circuits of knowledge of self and world appearing to 
momentarily grasp the totality of our conditions of experience and knowledge of others. To 
develop this fu the  I d a  out F eud s a ou t of the oti es of joki g alo gside “i el s 
(1950) sociology of the secret. 
The Ethics of the Joke Secret 
A: Self-Other relations in the joke-secret 
Go dillo s uotatio  a o e egi s:  
18 
 
You try and set up what the power of a thing has over you, why 
it’s a pro le  […] It is a out leadi g the audie e to the 
specific thing that bothers you. 
Gordillo describes a journey of self-other eeti g i  a ep ese tatio . Go dillo s o edia , 
the first person, brings you, the third-party, together not through mutual recognition of self-
other but through recognition of a shared representation, a second party, the humorous 
object - the stitching in the wallet. However, this representation is a vanishing mediator: it is 
not stitching in a wallet but his wallet. The second party, the humorous object, becomes the 
proxy for the first-person; the comedian as object and agent of ridicule. It is in this 
representation that an ethical moment of mutual coming together takes place. The 
mutuality of the self-othe  o u s th ough a dis o e : I e e  ould ha e thought to fi d 
that a p o le .  The dis o e  of the stit hed allet  p o le , the pe ei ed fault in 
comprehending the logical formation by which our worlds add-up, comes to produce 
another reality beyond our immediate comprehension of everyday experience. 
Here the joke-form shares qualities with secrecy as they register human 
togetherness in an analogous fo . “e e , “i el :  otes, offe s… the 
possibility of a second world alongside the manifest world; and the latter is decisively 
i flue ed  the fo e .  “u h is Go dillo s a ou t of the hu o ous ess of the ode  
comedian: a new world appears alongside the obvious with the newly discovered problem 
(a secret shared), and the obvious world is rendered humorous to bring together relations 
of mutuality where previously there would have been no, properly speaking, mutual 
recognition of this kind. A shared joke suggests the possibility of a second world which owes 
its existence to the mutual dependency of one person to another. The possibility of this 
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second world in secrecy (and, here, jokes), Simmel (1950:330, added emphasis) maintains, 
offe s a  i e se e la ge e t of life: numerous contents of life cannot even emerge in 
the presence of full publicity.  “u h e la ge e t of life th ough se e , u de  ode  
conditions, occurs through an economy of knowing. In modernity, secrecy tends toward a 
narrowing of the teleological sequence of purposes by way of making what was once public 
secret. Here frustrations over wallet stitching are rendered and understood as 
idiosyncrasies, not common knowledge of the way the world is. We never would have 
known this to be a problem; we have entered the secret world of the comedian through an 
abject representation of them. It is in the economising of knowledge that a Freudian theory 
of jokes, as a so ial p o ess, a d “i el s so iolog  of the se et meet for a philosophy of 
self-other relations. 
F eud s :  i te tio  i  The joke as so ial p o ess  is to ask what is the part 
pla ed …  the othe  pe so  to ake e laugh? His o lusio  is that as e e  joke 
de a ds its o  audie e , the  laughing at the same joke evidences far-reaching 
ps hi al o fo it .  F eud, :  But it is i  the circuitous process through which 
jokes bring to light such mutuality between persons that the ethics of self-other reveal their 
peculiarly modern qualities. Joking partners, what Freud terms the first and third persons 
(the self and other), bring to light their mutuality also through an economy of knowing. 
Jokes e ui e, as do se ets, a si ila  p o ess of i gi g to light life s o te ts outside of 
the p ese e of full pu li it . A d it is i  the F eudia  theo  of the e o o  of it - 
where an extensive thought process collapses and the saved psychic energy is realised in the 
pleasure of laughter as a physical response - we have, in fact, an account of self-other 
relations hidden in the language of economy and physiology. Overcoming an inhibition is 
what the third-pa t , the Othe , has to a hie e to laugh at , the fi st pe so  self s, joke. 
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B  doi g so F eud ill speak of laughte  as so e e penditure in energy- ha ge … ei g 
lifted a d eleased , a d that the thi d-pe so  pu hases the pleasu e of the joke with a 
very small expenditure of his own. He is made a present of it, as it were.  F eud, : , 
added emphasis)  
From the language of physiology and economics, to the language of giving and 
receiving. The role this psychic and physiological economy plays in this gift-giving process is 
a re-orientation of established, normatively ordered, patterns of thought through which we 
ie  life s ontents. (Wallet stitching being one of them). Freud would emphasise that such 
a eo de i g of life s ontents is already present in the third-party (the Other); all they 
needed was my joke to bring it to light. But whereas Freud would stress repression and its 
relief, here I am stressing the ethical moment whereby I am essential to bringing to light 
Your laughter, and You are essential to My joke telling. This is the form of our ethical 
relation. 
Our shared joke recalls the second world alongside the manifest world in secrecy; we 
have found another way to be together, and in doing so reworked the established ways of 
thinking in order to create a novel recognition of our togetherness. Jokes, as with secrets, 
require recognition by third parties to occur. Put this a , F eud s la guage of a ps hi  
economy is nothing other than the blocks and obstacles of a prolonged teleological series of 
action being lifted. The secret and the joke shorten the teleological series of purposes. For 
when Freud (2002:151) finds that the motive for joke telling is, precisely, because we cannot 
laugh at our own jokes in isolation, the result is that the joke, ethically speaking, establishes 
relations of mutuality between persons who are only partly capable of accounting for the 
chain of associations which make them mutual persons to begin with. The ethical moment 
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of the joke occurs when laughter both assures me of my humour by giving you pleasure, and 
ou  pleasu e is a e ed , i  F eud s :  o ds, to  loss of pleasu e hen the 
joke has eased to e a o elt .  I  this the ethi s of o ed  is a  ethi s of i di iduatio  
and its recognition. You make up for my loss of self. I must give to you a representation of 
e e a  utuall  laugh at  i  o de  to et a e ou  utuality, and, as we move toward 
laughter, you make my stupidity your own. 
 But the point worth stressing here is that to turn idiosyncrasy into identification, a 
large amount of individuation needs to already be in place. Comedy becomes confessional 
and revelatory because of a high degree of social differentiation and extends such 
differentiation by offering to present collective neuroses as individual foibles. The work of 
the joke is to extend the work of secrecy from self to Other. Between the first and the third, 
the o edia s a i atu e of the sel es becomes a consummated representation of a self 
in-between you and (s)he. What the joke-secret does, between first and third person, is 
produce a space in which the realisation of individuality occurs through the mutual 
togetherness without either first or third giving up on their mutual difference and 
autonomy. This i a d ha e  of the joke is the highest good fo  a  ethi s of ode  
individuality. 
B: Laughing at and with 
 But how this good is achieved is problematic. 
if you’re laughi g, at so e level you’re laughi g at the , ut 
there is a massive identificatio  goi g o , at a eta level… 
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Plato s Philebus (1987) reasoned that laughter at our friends mixes pleasure with malice and 
therefore cannot be considered a  ethi al good: ali e p odu es a pai  of the soul . 
Gordillo is aware of this troubling aspect of our laughter, but points to the opposite. To 
u de sta d the atu e of that f ust atio , p ope l  speaki g, is to go th ough the p o ess 
of disavowing our mutuality with another to better laugh with. The ethical problem of our 
laughter - our laughing at - is at once our way of maintaining our individuality and difference 
as well as ho  e ge e ate ou  utualit  to othe s. The o edia s i est e t i  ad ess 
in the joke-form has the virtue of making them disown themselves to find commonality with 
others, while others find commonality with them by repudiating such commonality to begin 
ith. As oted, i  et ee  this e ha e the o su atio  of the o edia s caricature of 
themselves: a self which is impossible without the mutual dependency of others and where 
mutual dependency does not dissolve the individuality and difference of each party. 
“i el s p o le  of so ia ilit , e a e al a s o ki g ith is ep esentations of each 
other), is given new ethical accent when we consider the secret joke-work at play in 
comedy. 
We have found in comedy a mutual, collaborative act of individual and collective 
deception; we have invented a way to maintain the mutual ignorance we have of each 
othe s i te io , i e -worlds through a social form which necessitates that we both give 
each other the obligation to retrace our inner, idiosyncratic patterns of thought and 
disavowal our ownership to such thought processes. The result is an ethics of individuality 
achieved through collective processes. Comedy gives us a way for the central psychological-
episte ologi al p o le  of is-)representation in our sociability to be rendered 
bearable. Not only do we always choose a partial series of our inner thoughts, (for if we did 
tell each other everything we thought we would all be sent away (Simmel, 1950:312)). But 
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Simmel goes further than this: we cannot imagine social bonds without mutual absences on 
oth sides. “i el s t ul  adi al lai  is that it is only because there remains, what 
Ba ou  :  alls, this sile t i te io it  i  all social bonds, that social bonds become 
possible. So, what the joke-secret circles around is the uncanny experience on what 
intimation of a shared silent interiority may be like. The ambivalence of our laughter – am I 
laughing with you or at you, and therefore at me or with me? – registers the truth that 
neither of us want to fully share in this. 
For what we have been describing is a situation where I must acknowledge the other 
inside me; I must make my representation of you a representation of me. And I get lost in 
the process: am I laughing at you or with you? This is the efficacy of the joke-secret: we still 
need some way to keep ourselves together and apart. One way to preserve ourselves as 
distinct, to properly appreciate that our caricatures of each other are inadequate, is for the 
joke-secret to be one where our fantasies of intellectual supremacy gain their full 
recognition in their being laughed at. We have mutual acknowledgement by mutual 
disavowal. 
In Stitches: beyond the pleasure principle 
…otherwise you would just laugh at stuff and not engage with 
it, and then horrible things will be done to you in the name of 
making you laugh. 
If all that comedy amounted to was pleasurable laughter, no good could come of it. We are 
beyond the pleasure principle. Go dillo s state e t e hoes Be stei s :  e a ks 
o  K iste a s  Powers of Horror: a je t o ed  su li ates the death-d i e… . To 
i agi e a pu el  o i  o ld ould e to i agi e the possibility of beings who live in a 
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symbolic universe in which the terms of that symbolic no longer provide the conditions for 
sig ifi a t hu a  sepa ate ess o  o e ted ess.  Be stei , :  
 Our desi e fo  o ed  o es at a ti e he  ou  se se of sepa atio  a d 
o e tio  – whether we are being laughed at or with – has become our most abiding 
p eo upatio . E e  though this essa  has t a ed the t i ialities of allet stit hi g , the 
point is that the desi e to e stit hed  a k togethe  is itself a o e  sto  fo  the leedi g  
(violence and aggression) which proceeded it. One of the reasons for the pervasiveness of 
o ed  i  the eal s of life e take ost se iousl  a d o side  o laughi g atte  is 
precisely because we feel improper forms of exchange is all we have got. But it is the 
impermissibility of the desires found in our laughter that concern us the most: we really 
worry about our ethical status when we either look back on what we found funny in the 
past (e.g. old sit-coms) or what other people find funny now. So, when it comes to finding 
something funny, the ethics of the joke-secret is orientated to keeping ourselves together 
while apart. But what we have found is that the joke-secret is a form of sociability where we 
experience a strange or even uncanny sense of mutuality with people who, prima facie, we 
feel ourselves to have nothing in common with. By way of conclusion, I want to offer the 
ethics of comedy discerned here as a contribution to discussions on the politics of 
os opolita is  fou d i  F eud s late iti gs (Rumble, 2011; Said, 2003; Kristeva, 1991) 
a d “i el s essa  o  the st a ge  Goodstei , ; .  
Goodstei s : ff; 2016:43-  a ou t of The “t a ge  “i el, , 
hi h she pla es alo gside F eud s The U a  , a gues that hat really makes the 
st a ge  st a ge o  u a  u ho elike  is that the o o alities e ha e ith people 
ho a e ot like us  a e o o alities that o e t us o l  e ause the  o e t a g eat 
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a  people.  “i el, :  The poi t is that, like Freud said of sharing a sense of 
hu ou , that hi h is o o  to t o is pe haps e e  o o  only to them but belongs 
to a general conception which includes much else besides, many possibilities of si ila ities.  
(Simmel, 1971:148, original emphasis) It is this uncanny possibility of connection to 
unlimited people, beyond our limited (social and cognitive) circle, that terrifies us. 
Strangeness, Goodstein (2016:49) points out, is not merely the preserve of the other but all 
of us. 
 Herein lies a cosmopolitan ethics for a divided present. Kristeva (1991), Said (2003) 
and Rumble (2011) discern a politics of cosmopolitanism in psychoanalytic accounts of 
where the boundaries between self and other become indiscernible: the uncanny double, 
like “i el s st a ger, breaks down the boundaries between myself and others. Such 
a ou ts suggest fo  “aid :  that ide tit  a ot e thought or worked through 
itself alone; it cannot constitute or even imagine itself without that radical originary break 
or flaw which will not be ep essed…  I  this adi al, o igi a  eak hi h o ti ues to 
hau t us, K iste a :  sees the dis o e  of psychoanalysis as offering a politics of 
os opolita is : ou  solida it  is to e fou ded upo  the o s ious ess of ou  
unconscious.  I  this K iste a :  pla es us fa  e o ed f o  a all to 
othe hood , a d fo  “aid :  a fa   f o  an uncritical multiculturalism of 
tole a e a d o passio . B  o t ast the esse e of a os opolita is  of u a  
strangeness is founded upon an early stage in our psychic and social development where 
indiscernible boundaries of self-world, self-other becomes reaffirmed: we must attend to a 
t ou li g, disa li g, desta ilizi g se ula  ou d.  “aid, :  Bou d togethe  i  this 
sha ed ou d of sepa atio  ‘u le, :  e ust e ko  ith ou  sha ed 
singularity and finitude. If this politics is ot lea i g to tole ate  ea h othe  ette , it is 
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learning that the uncanny stranger makes us acknowledge that a point of view is never 
wholly ours. What you are doing when you laugh at yourself and others (both strangely 
uncanny, incomplete versions of each other) is properly attending to the desire of comedy 
at a time of division: facing up to the fact that there is no way back together or forever apart 
again. 
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